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Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kuhlmann v. Wilson,' the United States Supreme Court se-
verely limited a suspect's sixth amendment right to counsel.2 The
decision marks a reversal of a previous trend of increasingly expan-
sive interpretations given to the right to counsel.3 In United States v.
Henry,4 the Supreme Court held that certain statements made to a
paid jailhouse informant, who acted under police orders and ac-
tively engaged the defendant in conversation, could not be admitted
into evidence at the defendant's trial.3 Henry, however, did not
reach those instances where an informant, either by his actions or
words, does nothing to entice incriminating statements. 6 The
Supreme Court reached this "passive informant"7 issue in Wilson.
While the jailcell environment created by the police authorities in
Wilson was arguably indistinguishable from the jailcell informant
1 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986).
2 The sixth amendment provides in relevant part, "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the ight... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S.
CoNsT. amend. VI.
3 This trend is discussed at length infra notes 55-76 and accompanying text.
4 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
5 Id. at 269-74. Under the exclusionary rule, statements obtained by unconstitu-
tional or otherwise illegal means cannot be admitted at trial. The exclusionary rule acts
as a disincentive for using unlawful means to obtain evidence and helps maintain the
purity of the American legal system. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
6 The Henry majority clarified, "[N]or are we called upon to pass on the situation
where an informant is placed in close proximity but makes no effort to stimulate conver-
sations about the crime charged." Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 n.9. The concurring opinion
also advised, "Similarly, the mere presence of a jailhouse informant who had been in-
structed to overhear conversations and to engage a criminal defendant in some conver-
sations would not necessarily be unconstitutional." Id. at 276 (Powell, J., concurring).
7 "Passive informant" refers to the Henry majority's description of an informant who
"is placed in close proximity but makes no effort to stimulate conversations about the
crime charged." Id. at 271 n.9. See supra note 6.
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scheme rejected by the Henry Court, the Wilson Court permitted the
admission of the accused's statements into evidence.
A plurality of Justices8 in Wilson also limited the criteria that
lower courts are to consider in granting successive federal petitions
of habeas corpus. Previously, federal trial judges exercised their
"sound discretion" on a case-by-case basis in determining whether
to hear successive habeas corpus petitions.9 District court judges
were guided by United States v. Sanders,10 a Supreme Court decision
that stipulated that successive review should be given in cases where
review would serve the "ends ofjustice." I I The Sanders Court, how-
ever, refused to create an exhaustive list of factors to be considered
in an "ends of justice" analysis. 12 The Wilson plurality found that
the Sanders Court's analysis provided insufficient guidance for lower
courts.' 3 Accordingly, the Wilson plurality asserted that the "ends of
justice" would be served only in those instances where the defend-
ant could make "a colorable showing of factual innocence."' 14
This Note examines the Wilson opinions and concludes that the
Court's decision represents an unjustified limitation on an accused's
sixth amendment right to counsel. This Note argues that the
Court's decision is an aberration from the Court's own "deliberately
elicited"' 15 framework developed in Massiah v. United States 16 and re-
fined in Henry. Moreover, this Note considers Wilson's impact for
the future and concludes that the police practices encouraged by the
decision are likely to foster greater abuses of an accused's rights.
Finally, this Note examines the plurality-created standard for the re-
view of successive federal habeas corpus petitions and suggests the
problems that are likely to arise from the application of this
standard.
8 See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
9 In Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1963), the Court stated:
The principles governing [the] justifications for denial of a hearing on a successive
application are addressed to the sound discretion of the federal trial judges. Theirs
is the major responsibility for the just and sound administration of the federal col-
lateral remedies, and theirs must be the judgment as to whether a second or succes-
sive application shall be denied without consideration of the merits.
10 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
11 Id. at 17.
12 See id.
13 Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616, 2622 (1986).
14 Id. at 2627.
15 For a discussion of the "deliberately elicited" standard, see ifra notes 62-76 and
accompanying text.
16 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
744 [Vol. 77
1986] RIGHT TO COUNSEL: JAILHOUSE INFORMANTS 745
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF WILSON
On July 4, 1970, Joseph Wilson and two accomplices fatally
shot a night dispatcher while robbing a New York City taxicab ga-
rage. 17 Wilson surrendered himself to authorities four days after
committing the offenses. s Although witnesses testified that Wilson
was at the garage before the crime1 9 and observed him fleeing with
money soon after the robbery, Wilson denied any involvement. 20
Wilson did admit to witnessing the robbery and gave the police a
description of the perpetrators.2 1 He claimed, however, that he did
not know their identities. 22 Wilson also asserted that he fled from
the scene to avoid being held responsible for crimes he did not
commit.23
After his arraignment, Wilson was placed in a cell with another
prisoner, Benny Lee. 24 The window in the cellblock overlooked the
Star Taxicab Garage, the scene of Wilson's criminal offenses. 25 Un-
beknownst to Wilson, Lee had been recruited by Detective Cullen to
listen for and report any remarks made by Wilson that might reveal
the identities of Wilson's confederates. 26 Initially, Wilson repeated
to Lee the same story he had offered the police, reasserting his lack
of involvement. 27 Although Lee was instructed to simply "keep his
ears open," 28 Lee advised Wilson that his narration "didn't sound
too good" and that Wilson should "come up with a better story." 29
After a disturbing visit from his brother,3 0 Wilson made new admis-
17 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2619.
18 Id.
19 Workers at the garage observed Wilson and two unidentified men talking on taxi-





24 Id. Lee was a three-time offender awaiting sentencing resulting from a guilty plea
to a robbery charge. Joint Appendix of Parties at 43, Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct.
2616 (1986)(No. 84-1479).
25 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2619.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. The court of appeals found that "Detective Cullen had told Lee to listen 'to see
if [he] could find out' the names of the other two men involved in the crimes, but not to
'question the man in any way.'" Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F.2d 741, 742 (2nd Cir.
1984).
29 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2619 & n.1. Lee's version of exactly what he had told Wilson
varied slightly between the hearing to determine the admissibility of his testimony and
Wilson's trial. The substance of his remarks were essentially the same in either version.
See id. at 2619 n.1.
30 Wilson's brother related to Wilson that family members were distressed because
they believed Wilson murdered the garage employee. Id. at 2619.
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sions to Lee.3' Wilson admitted to Lee that he had participated in
the robbery and in the shooting. 32 Lee then informed Detective
Cullen of Wilson's statements.3 3
Before the trial began, Wilson unsuccessfully moved to sup-
press the statements made to Lee on the ground that they were ob-
tained in violation of Wilson's sixth amendment right to counsel. 34
The trial court found that the informant had been carefully in-
structed not to ask any questions of Wilson concerning the crime,
had carefully followed this advice, and, therefore, had only listened
to Wilson's confessions. 35 The trial court ruled that the statements
were "spontaneous" and "unsolicited" and, thus, admissible under
New York law.36 A New York jury found Wilson guilty of common
law murder and felonious possession of a weapon.37 The appellate
division affirmed the conviction. 38 The New York Court of Appeals
denied Wilson leave to appeal.3 9
Wilson subsequently filed a federal petition for habeas corpus
relief.40 He reasserted that admission of the incriminating state-
ments into evidence violated his sixth amendment right to coun-
sel.41 The district court denied the writ 42 and a divided court of
appeals affirmed the denial. 43 The Supreme Court later refused a
31 Id. at 2619-20.
32 Id. at 2620.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. In determining the admissibility of Wilson's statements and the nature of the
informant's role in inducing such statements, the trial court heard the testimony of Lee
and Detective Cullen but not Wilson's testimony. Id. at 2620 & n.2.
36 Id. at 2620.
37 Id. Wilson was sentenced to twenty years to life for the murder of the garage
dispatcher and to a concurrent term of up to seven years on weapons charges. Id. at
2620.
38 People v. Wilson, 41 A.D.2d 903, 343 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1973)(without opinion).
39 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2620.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. The district court applied the Massiah standards to the trial court record and
concluded that Wilson's statements were "spontaneous" rather than responses to state
interrogation. Id.
43 See Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185 (2d Cir. 1978). The court of appeals
determined that a sixth amendment violation occurs if authorities make a deliberate ef-
fort to elicit incriminating statements from a criminal suspect after indictment of the
suspect and in the absence of legal counsel. Id. at 1189 (relying on the standard created
in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964)). The court of appeals required
"some circumstance more than the mere absence of counsel before a defendant's post-
indictment statement is rendered inadmissable." Wilson, 584 F.2d at 1190. The court of
appeals found no such circumstance in Wilson's case. Id. at 1190-91 (stressing that the
trial judge's factual findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28
U.S.C. § 2254).
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petition for writ of certiorari.44
After the United States Supreme Court ruling in United States v.
Henry, 45 Wilson, believing that Henry constituted a new rule of law
that should be retroactively applied to his case, filed a motion to
vacate his conviction in the state trial court.46 The court denied the
motion. 47
Wilson then returned to the federal district court with a second
federal habeas corpus petition.48 The district court found that this
case did not present the "passive informant" issue left open in
Henry. 49 Because Lee had made no "affirmative effort" to induce
the incriminating statements, the court held that Wilson's right to
counsel was not violated.50 In overruling the lower court's judg-
ment, a divided court of appeals found the crucial elements in Henry
and Wilson to be indistinguishable. 51 The court of appeals directed
the district court to hold a new trial for Wilson or order his
release. 52
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to con-
sider two issues. First, the Court contemplated whether justice re-
quired consideration of Wilson's second petition of habeas
44 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2620.
45 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
46 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2621. Wilson presumably noted that the Henry decision was
the first Supreme Court case to apply the "deliberately elicited" standard to jailhouse
informant practices and that the facts of the two cases were similar.
47 Id. The state trial court judge found that Henry was factually distinguishable from
Wilson since Lee was not paid for his services. Id. at 2621 & n.4. The trial court also
ruled that Henry was not to be applied retroactively under state precedent. Id. at 2621.
48 Wilson again argued that admission of his statements to Lee violated his right to
counsel. He also argued that Henry should be given retroactive effect. Id. at 2621.
49 Id. at 2621. See supra notes 6-7.
50 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2621. Because the district court found that Henry was distin-
guishable from Wilson, the lower court did not have to decide whether the holding in
Henry should be retroactively applied. See id. The lower court also noted the 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) presumption of correctness to be given to a state trial court's findings and
added that the trial record in this case supported this presumption. Id.
51 Wilson v. Henderson, 742 F.2d 741, 745, 748 (2d Cir. 1984). The court of appeals
first found that the "ends ofjustice" standard created in Sanders v. United States, 373
U.S. 1 (1963), required consideration of Wilson's successive habeas corpus petition.
Wilson, 742 F.2d at 743. Second, since the court of appeals believed that the two cases
were indistinguishable, the appellate court did not reach the "passive informant" ques-
tion. Id. at 745. The court also decided that a retroactive application of Henry was ap-
propriate since Henry involved the application of settled principles rather than the
creation of a new constitutional rule. Id. at 746-47.
In dissent, Judge Van Graafeiland argued that Wilson had failed to demonstrate by
convincing evidence that the initial findings of the state trial court were erroneous.
Judge Van Graafeiland also scorned the majority for finding that a successive review of
Wilson's habeas corpus petition would serve the "ends ofjustice" without properly sup-
porting that conclusion. Id. at 749-50 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
52 Wilson, 742 F.2d at 748.
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corpus. 53 Second, the Court considered whether the appellate court
correctly applied Henry and its progeny to the facts of this case.54
III. EVOLUTION OF THE HENRY-MASSIAH TEST
Since the landmark decision of Powell v. Alabama,55 the United
States Supreme Court has afforded the sixth amendment right to
counsel an increasingly expansive and powerful interpretation.56
Although the right to counsel has now permeated many aspects of
criminal investigations and prosecutions, 57 the Henry line of deci-
sions is concerned primarily with the postindictment efforts of state
agents to surreptitiously induce incriminating statements from
criminal defendants. The Henry line of decisions, however, actually
has its underpinnings in Spano v. New York, 58 a decision that involved
a coerced confession.
Police detectives in Spano employed lengthy interrogation and
other unseemly police tactics to persuade Spano to confess to a
murder.59 The Supreme Court barred the admission of Spano's
confession, ruling that the tactics employed by the detectives and
the denial of Spano's attempts to interpose his attorney in the inter-
rogation violated the defendant's right to counsel. 60 The concur-
ring opinions stressed the importance of adequate protection at all
53 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2621.
54 Id. at 2621-22.
55 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The Court held that the defendant in a capital offense crime
has the right to have adequate time to meet with counsel and to prepare a defense. Id. at
68-71. The Court found that the right to have sufficient time to confer with counsel
exists from the earliest stage of prosecution. The Powell Court termed this early investi-
gation and preparation as "vitally important" and an entitlement of each defendant. Id.
at 57 (citations omitted).
56 See infra note 57.
57 For example, the Court has ruled that an individual has the right to counsel while
in state custody. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that any individ-
ual in custody must be informed of certain rights including the right to remain silent, the
right to have an attorney present during questioning and the right to a court-appointed
attorney if the individual cannot afford one). The Court has established the right to
appointed counsel at all felony trials. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (holding that any defendant in a criminal trial who is unable to afford legal repre-
sentation cannot be assured a proper trial unless legal counsel is provided by the state).
The right to counsel was extended by the Court to any preliminary hearing where a
suspect enters a plea. See White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963)(holding that the pres-
ence of counsel is necessary to enable the accused to plead intelligently and with a full
understanding of all available defenses).
58 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
59 Id. at 317-20. The interrogation lasted all night and into the early morning hours,
totalling close to eight hours of nearly continuous questioning. The police also em-
ployed a friend of the defendant's in the interrogation. The friend falsely maintained to
Spano that he, the friend, would be in trouble if Spano did not confess. Id. at 319.
60 Id. at 322-24. The Court in a strongly critical opinion warned:
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stages of prosecution and found that the denial of this protection by
the police was sufficient grounds for reversal. 6 1
The first Supreme Court attempt to develop a standard for
scrutinizing surreptitious police practices in a right to counsel con-
text came in the 1964 opinion of Massiah v. United States.62 In Mas-
siah, the defendant and an accomplice were indicted on federal
narcotics law charges and were subsequently released on bail pend-
ing trial.63 Massiah's cohort, Colson, agreed to assist the govern-
ment in its continuing investigation of Massiah.64 Colson led
Massiah into making several incriminating statements that were sub-
sequently used against him at trial.65 Relying heavily on the lan-
guage of the Spano concurring opinions, the Court held:
[T]he petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee [of
the sixth amendment right to counsel] when there was used against
him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal
agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted
and in the absence of his counsel. 66
In the first right to counsel decision to involve the use of a jail-
house informant,67 the Court in United States v. Heny 68 applied and
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn
alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling
that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and
liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those
thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.
Id. at 320-21.
61 See id. at 324 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 326 (Stewart, J., concurring).
62 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
63 Id. at 202. Massiah was indicted for possession of narcotics aboard a United
State's vessel in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 184(a) (since repealed). Massiah, 377 U.S. at
202 & n.2.
64 Colson permitted a government agent to place a radio transmitter underneath the
front seat of his car and allowed the agent to overhear conversations between himself
and Massiah. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202-03.
65 Id. at 203. Colson and Massiah discussed Massiah's narcotics activities at length
while sitting in the parked automobile. Id. For a detailed account of the incriminating
statements made by Massiah, see United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 65 (2nd Cir.
1962).
The possible ways that state agents can lead a suspect into making incriminating
statements are varied. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), a police detective
coaxed a mentally disturbed religious prisoner into revealing the whereabouts of his
murder victim by persuading the prisoner that the victim was "entitled to a Christian
burial." Brewer, 430 U.S. at 392-93.
66 Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
67 Although United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), was the first case to involve
the use ofajailhouse informant (i.e., another prisoner acting in concert with the police),
Heny was not the first decision to confront the issue of an undercover government agent
placed in the suspect's cell. In Miller v. California, 392 U.S. 616 (1968)(per curiam), a
county sheriff's office employee was booked on a fictitious narcotics charge and placed
in a cell with Miller. The employee conversed with Miller and later testified at Miller's
trial. The employee revealed several incriminating remarks made by Miller during the
749
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refined the "deliberately elicited" language of Massiah. In Henry,
FBI agents employed an informant to listen to statements made by
any of the several federal prisoners occupying the same cellblock
and to report any useful information obtained.69 After the inform-
ant was released from jail, a federal agent contacted him and the
informant relayed several statements made by Henry during
Henry's incarceration. 70 These statements implicated Henry in the
armed robbery for which he had been indicted and was being held. 71
The informant was compensated by the federal government for his
work and he later testified about the statements at Henry's trial. 72
Henry moved to have his sentence vacated on the ground that the
admission of the informant's testimony constituted a violation of his
sixth amendment right to counsel.7 3
The Court in Henry framed the issue as "whether under the
facts of this case a Government agent 'deliberately elicited' incrimi-
nating statements from Henry within the meaning of Massiah."74
The Court found that the agent's actions violated the framework
created in Massiah.75 The majority held, "By intentionally creating a
situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements
without the assistance of counsel, the Government violated Henry's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel."7 6
IV. THE PLURALITY OPINION-SUCCESSIVE FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS PETITIONS
Justice Powell's opinion in Kuhlmann v. Wilson concerning the
issue of successive habeas corpus petitions constituted only a plural-
ity of four justices.77 The plurality rejected the court of appeals'
application of the "ends ofjustice" standard 78 set forth in Sanders v.
course of their conversations. The Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision, dismissed
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Id. at 616. Justice Marshall, in his dis-
senting opinion, argued that Miller's remarks had been "deliberately elicited" and
therefore violated Miller's sixth amendment right to counsel. Id. at 627 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
68 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
69 Id. at 266.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 266-67.
73 Id. at 267-68.
74 Id. at 270.
75 Id. at 274.
76 Id. at 274 (footnote omitted).
77 Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor. Justices Blackmun and White did not join in the plurality opinion, but
neither did they join with the dissent on the successive habeas corpus petition issue.
78 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616, 2628 (1986).
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United States.79 Justice Powell found, moreover, that the "ends of
justice" test 80 provided inadequate guidance to district courts con-
cerning when review should be granted. 81
Initially, the plurality briefly discussed the Sanders decision.8 2
Justice Powell noted that the Sanders Court addressed two funda-
mental issues.83 First, Sanders contemplated whether a lower court
could properly deny a federal prisoner's motion for habeas relief
without a hearing if the court found the motion to be an abuse of
the habeas corpus writ.84 Second, the Court in Sanders considered
the standard for examining successive habeas corpus petitions.8 5
The plurality in Wilson noted that Sanders directed district courts to
dismiss successive petitions if "the ends of justice would not be
served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application." 86 The
Wilson plurality found that the Sanders "ends ofjustice" framework
"provided little specific guidance as to the kind of proof" important
in an "ends of justice" inquiry.8 7 Justice Powell emphasized the
court of appeals' lack of discussion concerning that court's conclu-
sion that habeas corpus review would serve the "ends ofjustice. ' 88
The plurality concluded that the relevant considerations in a deci-
sion to review a successive federal petition for habeas corpus should
be more clearly defined. 89
79 373 U.S. 1 (1963). In Sanders, the defendant was arrested and charged with rob-
bing a federally insured bank. Sanders declined counsel, pleaded guilty, and was sen-
tenced to jail. He subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting
several errors in the pleading proceeding. The sentencing court denied the petition.
Later, Sanders filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus and this time alleged
specific facts in support of his claims. The district court denied this motion due to Sand-
ers' failure to allege these specific facts in his first petition. The court of appeals af-
firmed the lower court's denial of Sanders' second habeas corpus petition. The United
States Supreme Court, however, reversed and ruled that a hearing should have been
granted based on the second petition. Id. at 2-23.
80 The Sanders "ends ofjustice" test directed district courts to entertain a successive
petition if they determined that such review would serve the "ends ofjustice." Id. at 17.
Sanders placed the burden on the prisoner to show that the "ends of justice" would be
served by a new hearing. Id.
81 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2622.
82 See id.
83 Id.
84 See Sanders, 373 U.S. at 17-19.
85 See id. at 15-17. For a discussion of the difference between a "successive petition"
and an "abuse of the writ," see Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2622 n.6. Generally, a "successive
petition" raises "grounds identical to those raised . . . on a prior petition" while an
"abuse of the writ" raises "grounds that were available but not relied upon in a prior
petition." Id. at 2622 n.6.





Justice Powell reviewed the line of cases interpreting congres-
sional legislation in the area of federal habeas corpus review for per-
sons in state custody.90 The plurality related that, until the 1900's,
the Supreme Court limited federal examination of habeas corpus
petitions solely to the issue of the sentencing court's jurisdiction.9'
The plurality noted that the Court incrementally expanded habeas
review to other issues, but maintained that only the jurisdiction of
the state court was being questioned. 92 The contention that the
Court was only questioning the state court's jurisdiction, the plural-
ity explained, was later abandoned and the broad scope of the writ
of habeas corpus was recognized. 93
Justice Powell observed, however, that the trend in federal
habeas corpus review has not been one of constant expansion.9 4
Specifically, Justice Powell noted the Supreme Court's ruling in
Stone v. Powell,95 which stated, "[W]here the State has provided an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment
claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus
relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
search or seizure was introduced at his trial." 96 Because the interest
in a "rational system of criminal justice" outweighed the interest in
"Fourth Amendment rights," Justice Powell explained, the Court
limited the review of search and seizure claims.97
The plurality concluded that habeas corpus has historically
been guided by equitable considerations and available to "persons
whom society has grievously wronged."98 The plurality asserted,
90 Id. Congress did not authorize federal courts to review the habeas corpus peti-
tions of state prisoners until 1867. See id. at 2622 n.7.
91 Id. at 2623. For a discussion of the evolution of federal habeas review, see Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)(holding that evidence may be introduced in a federal
habeas corpus review of a state conviction despite a fourth amendment search and
seizure violation); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
92 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2623.
93 Id. The Court in Waley v.Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942) (citations omit-
ted) stated, "It [the use of the writ in the federal court] extends also to those exceptional
cases where the conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional rights of the ac-
cused, and where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his rights."
94 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2623.
95 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
96 Id. at 494 (footnotes omitted). See Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2623.
97 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2623 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976)).
The interest in criminal justice included the desire to focus the question at trial on the
defendant's guilt or innocence and to prevent the exclusion of important and reliable
evidence. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 490. Justice Powell added that this limitation on habeas
review was permissible since search and seizure claims usually have no bearing "on the
basic justice of his [a convicted defendant's] incarceration." Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2623
(quoting Stone, 428 U.S. at 492 n.3 1).
98 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2623 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438, 440-41 (1963)).
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however, that the scope of the habeas corpus writ is not simply a
function of the desire "to assure that an individual accused of crime
is afforded a trial free of constitutional error."99 The plurality
stated that, instead, the scope of the writ is the product of a "sensi-
tive weighing of the interests implicated."' l00
Justice Powell then returned to a consideration of the "ends of
justice" standard created in Sanders. Justice Powell noted that the
phrase "ends ofjustice" was once part of the statute governing peti-
tions of habeas corpus.' 0 ' Even though the Sanders Court cited this
statutory phrase, the plurality found that the Sanders opinion did lit-
tle to help identify the factors to be considered in an "ends ofjus-
tice" determination.' 0 2 Justice Powell observed that the present
statute governing successive habeas corpus petitions no longer con-
tains the "ends ofjustice" language.103 In interpreting the new leg-
islation, the plurality considered Congress' intent in changing the
statute.'0 4 The plurality found that the legislative history surround-
ing the changes to the statute suggested that Congress was greatly
concerned about the inadequate degree of finality in habeas corpus
judgments and the increasing number of state prisoner habeas
99 Id. at 2624.
100 Id.
101 Id. The plurality related:
The provision, which then governed petitions filed by both federal and state
prisoners, stated in relevant part that no federal judge "shall be required to enter-
tain an application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a
person... if it appears that the legality of such detention has been determined" by
a federal court "on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition
presents no new ground not theretofore presented and determined, and the judge
... is satisfied that the ends ofjustice will not be served by such inquiry."
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1964))(emphasis added by Wilson plurality).
102 Id. at 2624. The Sanders Court's failure to be more specific was not an oversight.
The Sanders Court concluded, "[T]he test is 'the ends of justice' and it cannot be too
finely particularized." Sanders, 373 U.S. at 17.
103 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2624. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (1966) states:
When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual issue, or
after a hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court has been denied by a court of the United States or a
justice or judge of the United States release from custody or other remedy on an
application for a writ of habeas corpus, a subsequent application for a writ of habeas
corpus in behalf of such person need not be entertained by a court of the United
States or ajustice or judge of the United States unless the application alleges and is
predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the ear-
lier application for the writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied that
the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the newly as-
serted ground or otherwise abused the writ.
104 The plurality stated, "[W]e are cognizant that Congress adopted the section in
light of the need... to weigh the interests of the individual prisoner against the some-
times contrary interests of the State in administering a fair and rational system of crimi-
nal laws." Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2625.
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corpus applications filed in the federal courts.'0 5
The plurality, nevertheless, found that the phrase "ends ofjus-
tice" still provides an adequate framework for federal courts to eval-
uate successive habeas corpus petitions. 10 6 Justice Powell noted
that "the permissive language of § 2244(b) gives federal courts dis-
cretion to entertain successive petitions under some circumstances"
but this discretion is to be tempered by Congress' intent to limit
such consideration to "rare instances."' 10 7 The plurality concluded,
therefore, that district courts need specific guidance regarding the
application of the "ends of justice" framework.10 8
In order to ascertain the applicable standard for an "ends of
justice" determination, the plurality examined the interests of soci-
ety and the prisoner in federal review of a successive habeas peti-
tion. 10 9 Justice Powell determined that in a successive review, a
prisoner's sole interest is his release from custody if he is, in fact,
innocent.110 Guilty prisoners, Justice Powell reasoned, have no in-
terest in successive review."1 Justice Powell then focused on the
interests of the state and found that the state has a strong interest in
finality.1 2 Justice Powell determined that finality in habeas corpus
judgments serves many legitimate state interests."13 First, Justice
Powell found that restrictions on the availability of habeas review
serve as a deterrent, 114 helping to reduce unlawful conduct." 15 Sec-
ond, Justice Powell determined that the state interest in rehabilita-
tion will be furthered by the prisoner's understanding that the
determination of his guilt is settled and that he must now accept
punishment.1 6 Third, the plurality stated that a federal determina-
tion that a prisoner must be retried may be difficult for the state to
practically accomplish due to great lapses in time.1 7
105 Id. See S. Rep. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); H.R. Rep. No. 1892, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
106 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2625.
107 Id. at 2625-26. See Advisory Committee Note, Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1979).







115 Id. The plurality postulated, "T]he deterrent force of penal laws is diminished to
the extent that persons contemplating criminal activity believe there is a possibility that
they will escape punishment through repetitive collateral attacks." Id. (footnote
omitted).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 2627. For example, the death, disappearance or inability of witnesses to
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After evaluating the interests of the prisoner and the state, the
four justices agreed:
In the light of the historic purpose of habeas corpus and the interests
implicated by successive petitions for federal habeas relief from a state
conviction, we conclude that the "ends of justice" require federal
courts to entertain such petitions only where the prisoner supplements
his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual
innocence. 118
Justice Powell asserted that a "colorable showing of factual inno-
cence" would narrow the review to those "petitioners who are justi-
fied in again seeking relief from their incarceration."' 1 9
Furthermore, the plurality would apply the "colorable showing of
factual innocence" standard where the primary or even sole evi-
dence of guilt was admitted unlawfully.' 20
Applying this newly created test to the facts of the Wilson case,
the plurality found no "colorable showing of factual innocence."'' 21
Since Wilson himself did not assert his innocence and the over-
whelming evidence clearly supported a guilty verdict, the plurality
found that the court of appeals was incorrect in ruling that review of
Wilson's successive habeas corpus petition would serve the "ends of
justice."' 22
V. THE MAJORITY OPINIoN-SIxTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT To COUNSEL
In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed and remanded the appellate court's decision, holding that
Wilson's sixth amendment right to counsel had not been violated.
Justice Powell delivered the majority opinion.1 23 He noted that the
Henry Court had not decided the "passive informant" question, 124
recall events, destruction of other evidence, etc., will contribute to the difficulty of retrial
after great time lapses. Justice Powell observed that the court of appeals ordered a re-
trial in this case some fourteen years after the murder and robbery were committed.
The plurality also briefly mentioned other interests in limiting successive petitions, in-
cluding reducing the financial resources expended in successive reviews and minimizing
the frictions inherent in the federalism relationship. Id. at 2627 n.16.
118 Id. at 2627. The requirement that a defendant seeking federal habeas review make
"a colorable showing of innocence" was a standard suggested by Judge Friendly in an
academic composition. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on CiminalIJudg-
ments, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 142, 160 (1970).
119 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2627.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 2628.
122 Id.
123 Justice Powell was joined by Chief'Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun,
Rehnquist and O'Connor.
124 See supra note 7.
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but had expressly reserved judgment on that issue.125 In Wilson, the
Court perceived a "passive informant" scenario. 126 The majority
relied on the framework established by Massiah and Henry to deter-
mine that the evidence obtained by a jailhouse informant "who was
'placed in close proximity but [made] no effort to stimulate conver-
sations about the crime charged'" could be admitted at trial.1 27
Initially, the majority reviewed the Supreme Court standards
for analyzing a claim that the sixth amendment right to counsel has
been violated. 128 The majority found that the Massiah line of deci-
sions had its underpinnings in the two concurring opinions from
Spano v. New York. 129 Justice Powell noted that "the concurring Jus-
tices [in Spano] also took the position that the defendant's right to
counsel was violated by the secret interrogation."'' 30 Justice Powell
observed that Justice Stewart had also commented that "an indicted
person has the right to assistance of counsel throughout the pro-
ceedings against him."'' l These two concurrences, according to
Justice Powell, served as the basis for the decision in Massiah v.
United States.' 32 The Wilson majority asserted that the "deliberately
elicited" test of Massiah 133 was designed to prevent both straightfor-
ward questioning and "indirect and surreptitious interroga-
tions."' 4 Justice Powell concluded, "Thus, the [Massiah] Court
made clear that it was concerned with interrogation or investigative
techniques that were equivalent to interrogation, and that it so
viewed the technique in issue in Massiah."' 35
The majority then focused on United States v. Henry, 13 6 which ap-
plied the "deliberately elicited" test of Massiah to incriminating re-
marks made to ajailhouse informant. 137 The Wilson majority did not
125 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2628. See supra note 6. The "passive informant" question was
also reserved in Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477 (1985). The Court explained, "Thus,
as in Henry .... we need not reach the situation where the 'listening post' [e.g., an
informant] cannot or does not participate in active conversation and prompt particular
replies." Moulton, 106 S. Ct. at 488 n.13.
126 See Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2630.
127 Id. at 2628 (quoting Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 n.9). See supra note 6.
128 See Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2628.
129 Id. For a discussion of Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), see supra notes
58-61 and accompanying text.
130 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2629 (citing Spano, 360 U.S. at 325 (Douglas, J., concurring)).
'3' Id. at 2629 (citing Spano, 360 U.S. at 327 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
132 Id. at 2629. Massiah v. United States is reported at 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
133 For a discussion of the Massiah decision and the "deliberately elicited" test, see
supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
134 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2629 (quoting Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206).
135 Id. at 2629 (footnote omitted).
136 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
137 For a discussion of the Henry decision, see supra text accompanying notes 67-76.
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note that the Henry Court refined the Massiah test,138 although most
commentators argue that the Henry Court made such a modifica-
tion. l3 9 The Wilson majority observed, however, that the Henry in-
formant had "developed a relationship of trust and confidence" and
"deliberately used his position to secure incriminating informa-
tion."' 40 The Wilson majority contended, "The [Henry] Court em-
phasized that those facts, like the facts of Massiah, amounted to
'"indirect and surreptitious interrogatio[n]"' of the defendant."' 4 '
Justice Powell completed his examination of the Massiah line of
cases by focusing on the Court's recent decision in Maine v.
Moulton.142 The facts of Moulton were strikingly similar to those the
Court encountered in Massiah.143 From the findings in Moulton, the
Wilson majority concluded, "As our recent recent [sic] examination
of this Sixth Amendment issue in Moulton makes clear, the primary
concern of the Massiah line of decisions is secret interrogation by
investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police in-
terrogation."' 144 The majority held that the use of a "passive in-
formant" did not violate the sixth amendment right to counsel even
if the informant was acting under a prior arrangement with authori-
ties.145 The Court ruled, "[T]he defendant must demonstrate that
the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely lis-
tening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating
remarks."1 46
138 See Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2629.
139 See Note, Inanimate Listening Devices: A Violation of Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel,
14 Loy. U. Gui. LJ. 359, 381 (1983)("Mhe Henry decision created a new and more
encompassing test than that of Massiah"); Note, Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode
Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1209, 1238 (1980)("Henry
extends Massiah by holding that, at least in the 'jail-plant' context, the government may
violate the sixth amendment even though it lacked a specific purpose to elicit incriminat-
ing statements at the time they were elicited.").
140 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2629 (quoting Henry, 447 U.S. at 269-70).
'41 Id. (quoting Henry, 447 U.S. at 273).
142 106 S. Ct. 477 (1985).
143 As in Massiah, the defendant in Moulton was encouraged by his accomplice to make
incriminating statements. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. at 482 ("Apologizing for his poor mem-
ory, he [the accomplice] repeatedly asked Moulton to remind him about the details of
what had happened, and this technique caused Moulton to make numerous incriminat-
ing statements." (footnote omitted)). A wire transmitter was used by the police, with the
accomplice's consent, to record conversations and eventually the incriminating remarks
were used in the defendant's trial. Id. at 481-82. The Moulton Court found that these
procedures violated the sixth amendment right to counsel, since the informant's actions
were" 'the functional equivalent of interrogation.'" Id. at 488 n. 13 (quoting Henry, 447
U.S. at 277 (Powell, J., concurring)).





Applying this analysis of the sixth amendment line of decisions
to the Wilson facts, the majority found no violation of the sixth
amendment right to counsel. 147 The majority, moreover, disagreed
with the court of appeals' conclusion that the case did not present
the "passive informant" issue.1 48 The appellate court's mistaken
conclusion, according to Justice Powell, stemmed from the appellate
court's "failure to accord to the state trial court's factual findings the
presumption of correctness expressly required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)."' 49 The Court decided that the court of appeals' conclu-
sion concerning the interaction between the informant Lee and the
defendant were unsupported by the state court's findings of fact.' 50
The majority stated:
After thus revising some of the trial court's findings, and ignoring
other more relevant findings, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
police "deliberately elicited" respondent's incriminating statements.
This conclusion conflicts with the decision of every other state and
federal judge who reviewed this record, and is clear error in light of
the provisions and intent of § 2254(d).' 5 '
Based upon the factual findings of the trial court and the majority
holding that the use of a "passive informant" did not violate the
sixth amendment right to counsel, the Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of the court of appeals and held that the testimony of the
informant was admissible into the trial proceedings.' 52
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. (citations omitted). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1966) states in relevant part:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a
determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court
of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and the
State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding,
written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to
be correct ....
150 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2630. The state court findings of fact, noted by Justice Powell,
included the careful instructions given by Officer Cullen to Lee, Lee's adherence to
those instructions and the existence of other solid evidence against the defendant. The
only blemish in the record Justice Powell mentioned was the remark made by Lee to
Wilson that his story "didn't sound too good." Id.
151 Id. at 2631 (citation omitted). The court of appeals' belief that "Lee's ongoing
verbal intercourse with [Wilson] served to exacerbate [Wilson's] already troubled state
of mind" was determined to be "completely at odds with the facts found by the trial
court." Id. at 2630-31 (quoting the court of appeals' finding, Wilson v. Henderson, 742
F.2d 741, 745 (2nd Cir. 1984)).
152 Id. In a very brief concurring opinion, ChiefJustice Burger subscribed fully to the
majority opinion. Id. at 2631 (Burger, CJ., concurring). Chief Justice Burger con-
tended that situations involving only the recording of remarks made by prisoners can be
wholly distinguished from those instances involving the encouragement and subsequent
recording of those same remarks. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring). The ChiefJustice ad-
758 [Vol. 77
1986] RIGHT TO COUNSEL: JAILHOUSE INFORMANTS
VI. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented on both
the habeas corpus and right to counsel issues. Justice Brennan criti-
cized the plurality's historic understanding of habeas corpus. Jus-
tice Brennan asserted that the plurality adopted "a revisionist
theory of this Court's habeas corpus jurisprudence."' 15 3 Moreover,
he accused the plurality of implying that federal habeas corpus re-
view may not be available to a prisoner in his first petition as a mat-
ter of right, even if the prisoner asserts a violation of a constitutional
right.1 54 The dissent further noted the plurality's focus on factual
innocence as a cornerstone of habeas corpus review and their subse-
quent decision that factual innocence is crucial to an "ends of jus-
tice" inquiry.1 55 Justice Brennan disagreed with the plurality's
contention that factual innocence has played an important role in
habeas review.156 He maintained, "Neither the plurality's standard
for consideration of successive petitions nor its theory of habeas
corpus is supported by statutory language, legislative history, or our
precedents."1 57
Justice Brennan followed with his own historical interpretation
of the scope and evolution of habeas corpus.158 He contended that
habeas corpus review traditionally has not focused on a weighing of
prisoner and state interests.1 59 Justice Brennan identified one area
of habeas corpus adjudication where a balancing of state and pris-
oner interests has occurred-the area of collateral review of claims
of constitutional violations procedurally defaulted in state court. 160
In this area of collateral review, Justice Brennan explained, "a state
prisoner generally must show cause and actual prejudice."' 16 The
ded that the current abuse of habeas corpus writs needs to be impeded. Id. (Burger,
CJ., concurring).
153 Id. at 2631 (BrennanJ., dissenting).
154 Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting). Justice Brennan determined that under the plurality's
understanding of habeas corpus, an initial review might be denied if the prisoner could
not show his interest in freedom was stronger than the state's interest in the enforce-
ment of criminal laws. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
155 Id. at 2632 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
156 See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
157 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted).
158 See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
159 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
160 Id. at 2633 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)). In
Wainwright, the Court concluded that the requirement of showing cause and prejudice
would force defense lawyers to make constitutional claims at the state trial court level,
stopping needless reviews and adding to the integrity of the original trial. Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). The Wainwright Court refused to give precise definitions for
the terms "cause" and "prejudice." See id. at 91. As a general rule, "cause" requires the
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dissent rejected the plurality's claim that a balancing of state and
prisoner interests has been adopted for fourth amendment exclu-
sionary claims. 162 The dissent asserted that the limitations created
in Stone v. Powell for review of fourth amendment claims did not "es-
tablish a new regime for federal habeas corpus under which the pris-
oner's interests are weighed against the State's interests" and have
not been extended by the Court to any other context.' 63 As a result
of this analysis of habeas corpus jurisprudence, Justice Brennan
stated:
Despite the plurality's intimations, we simply have never held that fed-
eral habeas review of properly presented, nondefaulted constitutional
claims is limited either to constitutional protections that advance the
accuracy of the factfinding process at trial or is available solely to pris-
oners who can make out a colorable showing of factual innocence. On
the contrary, we have stated expressly that on habeas review "what we
have to deal with is not the petitioner's innocence or guilt but solely
the question whether their constitutional rights have been
preserved."1 64
The dissent found statutory support for its argument that fed-
eral courts were to be given broad discretion in deciding whether to
review habeas corpus petitions.' 65 The dissent observed that 28
defendant to show adequate reasons for the defendant's failure to raise the constitu-
tional violation claim in state court while "prejudice" requires the defendant to show
some actual harm resulting to the defendant from the admission of the illegally obtained
evidence. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976); Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 91
(1977). See also Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982)(reaffirming the use of the cause and
prejudice framework). In Wilson, Justice Brennan observed that the balancing utilized in
procedurally defaulted claims was recognized as an exception to the general rule against
interest balancing as set forth in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). Wilson, 106 S. Ct.
at 2633 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 87).
162 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2633 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976))(for a discussion of Stone, see supra notes 91, 95-97 and accompanying text).
163 Id. at 2633 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan identified a number of deci-
sions where extensions of the Stone rationale to other areas of the law had been specifi-
cally declined by the Court. These identified decisions included Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 106 U.S. 2574 (1986)(refusing to extend Stone to the defendant's sixth amend-
ment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545
(1979)(refusing to extend Stone to claims of discrimination in the selection of grandju-
ries); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (refusing to extend Stone to the state pris-
oner's claim that evidence in support of the conviction was insufficient to allow a rational
trier of fact to determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2633
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
164 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2633-34 (Brennan,J., dissenting)(quoting Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923)(Holmes, J.)).
165 Id. at 2634 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan initially examined 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (1966) which empowers federal courts to grant habeas corpus writs. Justice
Brennan noted the broad language of § 2241(c)(3), enabling federal courts to extend
the writ to any prisoner held "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States." Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2634 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting in relevant
part § 2241(c)(3) (1966)). He concluded from the legislative history surrounding the
[Vol. 77
1986] RIGHT TO COUNSEL: JAILHOUSE INFORMANTS
U.S.C. § 2244(b) and The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in
the United States District Courts both contain language granting
federal courts considerable discretion to entertain habeas corpus
petitions.' 66 Furthermore, the dissent found considerable legisla-
tive support evidencing Congress' clear intent "that courts continue
to determine which successive petitions they may choose not to hear
by reference to the Sanders ends of justice standard."' 67 Justice
Brennan contended that there was no evidence of a congressional
intent to exclude guilty prisoners from obtaining federal habeas re-
view. 168 The dissent, therefore, would have sustained the historical
use of the phrase "ends of justice" established by the Sanders
Court. 169
After asserting that the "ends ofjustice" standard has continu-
ing vitality and that federal courts have been given historical respon-
sibility and statutory discretion to apply this standard, the dissent
found that the "respondent alleged a potentially meritorious Sixth
Amendment claim."' 70 Justice Brennan reasoned that the decision
in United States v. Henry '7' had clarified the sixth amendment right to
counsel analysis applicable to claims similar to Wilson's.' 72 Accord-
ingly, the dissent concluded that the court of appeals had not
abused its discretion by granting review of the successive habeas
corpus petition under this newly clarified legal standard.' 73
After rebutting the plurality's arguments and standard of re-
view for successive federal habeas corpus petitions, Justice Brennan
statute that Congress was satisfied with the Court's construction of habeas jurisdiction.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2634 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Rule 9(b) of the Rules Gov-
erning Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts states:
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails
to allege new or different grounds for relief and the the prior determination was on
the merits or, if new and different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the
failure of the petitioner to assert those grounds in a prior petition constituted an
abuse of the writ.
Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1979). For the text of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), see supra note 103.
167 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2635 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan referred to
the legislative history surrounding § 2244 and the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
in the United States District Courts (along with the Advisory Committee's Notes pertain-
ing to those rules) in support of his contention. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 2636 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169 See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
171 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
172 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2636 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the Hem-y
Court's sixth amendment right to counsel analysis, see supra text accompanying notes
67-76.
173 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2636 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
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addressed the majority opinion.1 74 Justice Brennan disagreed with
the majority's criticism that the court of appeals had disregarded the
state trial court's factual findings.1 75 The dissent noted that the trial
court's findings of fact in Wilson revealed several subtle forms of
"deliberate elicitation."'' 76 Therefore, the dissent observed, the ap-
pellate court had concluded that Wilson fell directly within the
framework of Henry and did not present the "passive informant"
question. 177
The dissent challenged the majority's interpretation of the right
to counsel line of cases.17 8 Justice Brennan viewed Maine v. Moulton
as confirming the right of the suspect to "rely on counsel as the
'medium' between himself and the State," as well as supporting the
proposition that the state cannot knowingly circumvent the attor-
ney-client relationship.17 9 The Wilson dissent's detailed considera-
tion of the important Henry decision contrasted sharply with the
majority's cursory treatment.180 Justice Brennan observed that the
Henry Court found that the government "deliberately elicits" incul-
patory remarks when it " 'intentionally creat[es] a situation likely to
induce [the accused] to make incriminating statements without the
assistance of counsel.' "181 The dissent noted that the informant in
Henry did not directly question the accused, but rather engaged the
defendant in conversation. 8 2 Justice Brennan cited three other fac-
tors that influenced the Henry Court and were critical to its ultimate
determination: 1) The informant was compensated for his services
on a contingent fee basis and therefore was provided with an incen-
174 See id. at 2637 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
175 Justice Brennan argued, "IT]he Court of Appeals did not disregard the state
court's finding that Lee asked respondent no direct questions regarding the crime" but
had only concluded that the "deliberate elicitation" test of Henry and Massiah involved
"other, more subtle forms of stimulating incriminating admissions than overt question-
ing." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). For the decision of the court of appeals, see Wilson
v. Henderson, 742 F.2d 741, 745 (2nd Cir. 1984).
176 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2637 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Specifically, the dissent re-
ferred to the cell's visual proximity to the taxi garage and the informant's advice to the
defendant to improve his story. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
177 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178 For a review of these decisions, see supra text accompanying notes 128-46.
179 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2637-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing Maine v. Moulton,
106 S. Ct. 477, 483-87 (1985)).
180 See id. at 2629.
181 Id. at 2638 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264,
274 (1980)).
182 Id. at 2628 (Brennan,J., dissenting). The Henry Court noted, "Yet according to his
own testimony, Nichols [the informant] was not a passive listener; rather, he had 'some
conversations with Mr. Henry' while he was in jail and Henry's incriminating statements
were 'the product of his conversation.'" United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 271
(1980).
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tive to obtain results; 8 3 2) Nichols' role as a government informant
was not revealed to Henry;18 4 and 3) Henry was incarcerated at the
time of his conversations with the informant. 185
Justice Brennan reviewed the use of the jailhouse informant in
Wilson and determined that the Henry factors should have been simi-
larly balanced.18 6 First, Justice Brennan perceived that the inform-
ant in Wilson had not directly questioned the suspect, but had
conversed with him.'8 7 Second, Justice Brennan noted that
although the evidence concerning state compensation for the in-
formant's services was disputed in Wilson, Lee had been compen-
sated for his services in the past. 88 Furthermore, the dissent
observed that Lee's identity as a government agent was never dis-
closed to Wilson.' 8 9 Finally, the dissent stressed that Wilson was
incarcerated, as was Henry, during the informant's acts of alleged
elicitation. 90 Unlike the facts in Henry, the dissent in Wilson noted
that a visit from the defendant's brother had been a major factor in
the decision to confess and confide in the cellmate informant.' 9 '
Justice Brennan found that the brother's visit was not enough to
excuse the government-created situation designed to induce incrim-
inating statements. 192 As a result of their conclusion that the state
had "deliberately elicited" incriminating remarks within the mean-
ing of Henry, Justices Brennan and Marshall would have affirmed the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision barring the informant's
unconstitutionally obtained evidence.193
In a brief separate dissent, Justice Stevens agreed with Justice
Brennan's interpretation of the right to counsel infringement stan-
dards and the application of these standards to the Wilson facts.' 9 4
Additionally, Justice Stevens agreed that "a colorable showing of
factual innocence" was not crucial to an "ends of justice" scru-
tiny.' 9 5 Justice Stevens determined that the district court did not
"abuse its discretion in entertaining the [habeas corpus] petition in
183 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2638 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing Henry, 447 U.S. at 270).
184 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing Henry, 447 U.S. at 270).
185 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing Henry, 447 U.S. at 274).
186 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
187 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
188 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
190 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a review of the Wilson facts, see supra notes 17-54
and accompanying text.
191 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2638-39 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192 Id. at 2639 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
193 See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 2639 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
195 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
763
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
this case."' 196 He conceded, however, that the case was close
enough on its facts to justify a district court's dismissal of a second
petition for a writ of habeas corpus 197
VII. ANALYSIS
A. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The majority in Kuhlmann v. Wilson failed to accurately balance
the factors in the sixth amendment right to counsel framework and
mistakenly found that Wilson presented the "passive informant" is-
sue.198 The Wilson majority, surprisingly, only cursorily reviewed
United States v. Henry 199 which involved a nearly identical set of facts.
The Wilson Court's examination of the jailhouse informant scenario
is, therefore, incomplete and subject to criticism.
The precedential value of Heny for Wilson is underestimated
even in Justice Brennan's dissent. Several tribunals have considered
the facts of Wilson and Henry and have found them to be indistin-
guishable. 200 Indeed, Judge Russell, dissenting from the court of
appeals' holding in Wilson, concluded that Wilson presented a
stronger sixth amendment right to counsel violation claim than did
Henry.201 Judge Russell contended, "Certainly, there can be no dis-
tinction drawn between this case and Wilson. In fact, if anything, the
facts in that [the Wilson] case were more favorable to the defendant's
claim than are the facts in this [the Henry] case. ' 20 2 An examination
of Henry and Wilson reveals how the Supreme Court underestimated
their similarities.
Henry involved the use of a jailhouse informant by government
officials. As in Wilson, the informant in Henry was instructed not to
interrogate the suspect.2 0 3 The Henry informant, similarly, was
196 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198 See supra note 7.
199 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
200 See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. at 281 (Blackmun and White, JJ., dissent-
ing)(observing that the police practices in each case were similar); United States v.
Henry, 590 F.2d 544, 553 (4th Cir. 1978) (Russell, J., dissenting); Wilson v. Henderson,
590 F.2d 408,409 (2nd Cir. 1978) (Oakes,J., dissenting)(petition for rehearing denied).
201 United States v. Henry, 590 F.2d 544, 548 (4th Cir. 1978)(Russell, J., dissenting).
202 Id. at 553 (Russell, J., dissenting).
203 Detective Cullen related the conversation he had with the informant Nichols:
I recall telling Nichols at this time to be alert to any statements made by these indi-
viduals [the federal prisoners] regarding the charges against them. I specifically
recall telling Nichols that he was not to question Henry or these individuals about
the charges against them, however, if they engaged him in conversation or talked in
front of him, he was requested to pay attention to their statements.
Hemy, 447 U.S. at 268.
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found not to have engaged in direct inquiry but only "had some
conversations with Henry. ' 20 4 In Wilson, however, the government
more affirmatively assured that a conducive environment for incrim-
inating statements was set. Detective Cullen specifically asked Lee
to find out from Wilson the identities of the other two participants
in the crime. 20 5 Wilson, moreover, was placed in ajail cell overlook-
ing the scene of his criminal offenses. 206 The close visual proximity
of the taxi garage forced Wilson to reflect continually on his crimes
and the story he gave to the police. Lee's statements to Wilson that
Wilson's story "didn't sound too good" and that Wilson should
"come up with a better story" 20 7 were clearly intended to elicit re-
sponses. If Wilson had broken down at that moment, his statements
probably would have been viewed as the product of an intentionally
created situation that was likely to induce such statements. Lee's
influences should not be overlooked merely because Wilson's con-
fessions were not immediately forthcoming. In Henry, there was no
more evidence of the informant directing questions to or eliciting
statements from the accused than in Wilson.
Justice Brennan's dissent in Wilson correctly cited the three
other factors of thejailhouse informant scheme that were influential
in Henry and found these same factors in Wilson.208 First, there was
substantial evidence that Lee was not acting solely out of an interest
in the successful prosecution of guilty defendants. Lee testified that
he had acted as an informant in approximately 150 other cases and
admitted to receiving compensation in every other one of those in-
stances.209 Even if money were not exchanged, similar incentives to
produce valuable evidence probably existed.210 State incentives,
whether offers of financial renumeration or improvements in pris-
oner treatment, could induce an informant to distort his recall of his
jail cell actions and conversations at a later trial. Second, the choice
not to reveal Lee's identity as an agent of the government resulted
204 Henry, 447 U.S. at 271.
205 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2619.
206 Id.
207 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
208 These factors included: 1) informant compensation on a contingent fee basis;
2) informant's role as a government agent unrevealed to the defendant; and 3) defend-
ant incarcerated during his conversations with the informant. See Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at
2638 (Brennan, J., dissenting); See also supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
209 See Joint Appendix of Parties at 104-05, Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. 2616
(1986)(No. 84-1479).
210 In responding to the Henry decision, one law enforcement official commented, "I
guess one thing we do now is, we don't pay the informant." But the officer added,
"Inhabitants ofjail cells tend to be looking for something for themselves." Mann, High
Court Curtails Use of Informants, L.A. Times, June 23, 1980, at 15, col. 2.
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
in disclosures "that an accused would not intentionally reveal to
persons known to be Government agents." 21' In a situation where
Wilson was unaware that Lee was a government agent, Wilson could
not have effectively waived his right to the assistance of counsel.
Third, Wilson, similar to Henry, was in custody at the time of the
alleged elicitation. Wilson, moreover, occupied the cell with only
one other prisoner, Lee.212 Lee had ample opportunity to develop
cellmate camaraderie, to share "a common plight," and to capitalize
on those "pressures" and "subtle influences" that confinement
under hostile conditions creates. 213 Lee had a better opportunity to
gain the confidence of the accused than did the informant in Henry.
If the jailhouse informant analysis of Henry was applied prop-
erly, then the informant practices in Wilson would have been held
unconstitutional under the sixth amendment. Some might argue,
however, that the Henry framework overprotects an accused's sixth
amendment rights. The considerations deemed important by the
Henry Court, however, are crucial to sixth amendment protection.
Since Powell v. Alabama,214 our judicial system has recognized that a
criminal defendant is often unable to properly protect his interests
against the powerful forces of the state, and resist the "nudges" 215
that may result in a suspect taking actions that are not in his self-
interest. Interrogation acts as a "nudge" by encouraging suspects
to make damaging disclosures. The Massiah Court, moreover, rec-
ognized that leading questions by a criminal cohort could serve as a
very effective "nudge." 216 It is an unacceptable intrusion on a crim-
inal defendant's right to counsel for the state to provide incentives
for the cohort to induce or "deliberately elicit" incriminating state-
ments and thereafter utilize such statements in prosecuting the
criminal defendant.
Given an appropriate incentive, ajailhouse informant, even one
that does not participate in explicit interrogation, can act as an
equally effective "nudge." Once compensation is offered, the in-
formant becomes an active agent of the government. The informant
211 United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 273 (1980).
212 Henry and Nichols, on the other hand, were "housed in the same cellblock with
several federal prisoners awaiting trial." Id. at 266.
213 The language quoted is from the Court's own analysis of the development of
cellmate camaraderie during confinement under hostile conditions. See Henry, 447 U.S.
at 274.
214 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See supra note 55.
215 One Henry commentator adopted the word "tug" from a dissenting opinion in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 512 (1966)(Harlan, J., dissenting). Note, Interrogation
Without Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United States v. Henry, 78 MICH. L. REv.
1209, 1241 (1980).
216 See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
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can begin fostering a deceptive relationship with the accused. The
informant's ultimate goal is to gain the defendant's trust and obtain
damaging confessions. In his pursuit of the defendant's confidence,
two factors aid the informant. First, the defendant and informant
will be spending a great deal of time together and presumably will
grow familiar with one another. The informant can shape that fa-
miliarity into trust. Second, the defendant and informant share an
apparent mutual adversary, the police power of the state.217 Con-
frontations with this mutual enemy will also help bring the pair
closer together and further encourage the defendant to make in-
criminating confidential disclosures.
The accused's responses to an informant's direct questions re-
garding the accused's crimes, however, are not admissible under
current law.2 18 Incriminating disclosures, nevertheless, can be in-
duced indirectly by other means. The informant, for example, may
be permitted to ask questions about the defendant's prior dealings
with the police, his need or desire for money, his familiarity with
weapons, or his hopes for support from family and friends. The in-
formant may even succeed in asking direct questions concerning the
crimes committed. In Wilson's case, only the informant and Detec-
tive Cullen testified about what went on in the defendant's jail
cell.219 In testimony at trial, an informant may distort the nature of
the questions posed to the accused and the accused's responses to
serve the informant's own interests. A court could have a difficult
time determining the veracity of the informant's statements.
The Henry decision recognized the potential for extensive jail-
house informant abuses. As a result, the Henry Court isolated three
preconditions which often lead to informant abuses. 220 First, the
informant needs an incentive such as a contingent fee. Without any
such consideration, the potential for mischaracterizations or abuses
by the informant is diminished. Second, confinement over a signifi-
cant period of time is necessary to develop camaraderie between the
accused and the informant. If there is no confinement, the suspect
is not subject to the intense need for association and support from
fellow inmates. Third, the agent's true role must remain undis-
closed to the accused. If the defendant knows he is facing a govern-
217 The term "apparent" is used here to contemplate those instances where the
"cellmate" is, in fact, an undercover policeman or detective and not a criminal suspect.
218 Direct questions would constitute "deliberate elicitation" under Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) and Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477 (1985). See supra notes
62-66, 142-46 and accompanying text.
219 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2619 & n.2.
220 See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
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ment agent he can properly guard his disclosures. Without such
knowledge, the defendant is unaware of the imminent peril. He
cannot exercise his right to summon his attorney and cannot volun-
tarily and intelligently waive that right. Abuse of one condition may
not be considered an obtrusive violation by the state. All three pre-
conditions together pose an effective device for extracting informa-
tion from the accused and, therefore, unjustifiably circumvent the
right to counsel.
The Wilson decision was not an unexpected reversal in the
Supreme Court's right to counsel philosophy. In fact, some com-
mentators expected this reversal in sixth amendment philosophy to
occur in Henry. In reporting the Supreme Court's decision in Henry,
one commentator remarked, "The [C]ourt's reasoning was so unex-
pected that there had even been predictions it might use the Henry
case to reverse the Massiah ruling and to throw out the limited pro-
tections against the use of informants that the Warren [C]ourt had
established." 22' Given the recency of Henry and Moulton 222 and
these decisions' affirmation of Massiah's continued viability, 223 sixth
amendment protections should continue to evolve within the "de-
liberately elicited" framework. The Wilson Court's failure to apply
the standards developed in Henry, however, raises serious questions
as to the Henry framework's continued viability. Instead of focusing
on the "situation" created by the state, the Wilson Court focused
solely on the informant's actions and his attempts to "stimulate"
conversation and prompt incriminating remarks. 224 Wilson has,
therefore, narrowed the scope of inquiry regarding the use of an
informant. The Wilson decision urges lower courts to review de-
fendant/informant dialogue rather than to examine the state-cre-
ated circumstances in their entirety. In the future, agents of the
state, whether or not their identities are revealed to the defendant,
still cannot ask direct questions bearing on the crime. Particularly
egregious informant coercions, in addition, will not receive court
approval. 225
221 Mann, High Court Curtails Use of Informants, L.A. Times, June 23, 1980, at 15, col. 2
(italics added).
222 106 S. Ct. 477 (1985). See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
223 In Henry, only Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, proposed to "re-examine" the
Massiah ruling. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 290 (1980) (Rehnquist,J., dissent-
ing). Justices Blackmun and White, in a separate dissent, voted to preserve the Massiah
ruling but not to expand the decision to contemplate the circumstances presented in
Henry. Id. at 289 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
224 See Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2630.
225 For example, physical threats or strongly worded advisements to "stop the lying
and confess" will not receive court approval.
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is necessary to explore
how state deployment ofjailhouse informants is likely to change as a
result of Wilson. The use ofjailhouse informants should increase as
a direct result of Wilson. Similarly, the sixth amendment right to
counsel protection, which is an essential element of our system of
justice, will be diminished.
Police authorities can play a large, and apparently acceptable,
role in the informant's activities. Compensation for an informant's
results seems acceptable under Wilson. More cautious authorities
can establish a more secretive, less tangible system of rewards. Such
a system could include a more sympathetic prosecutorial stance,
small favors such as extra visitor time or better food, and generally
better treatment. The police can assist the informant in developing
and sponsoring cellmate camaraderie. Arrangements could be
made to keep the the defendant and informant together in as many
prison activities as possible, or to treat the pair as if the state
planned to prosecute their criminal misdeeds in a similar fashion.
The increased use of informants might even induce the police to
treat the defendant more harshly. Verbal and physical abuse will
amplify the already uncomfortable prison experience and provide a
reason for camaraderie to flourish.
The state, moreover, will now be more anxious as a result of
Wilson to indict criminal suspects and incarcerate them quickly and
for as long a period as possible. Counsel for the accused would be
well-advised to provide for the expeditious release of their clients
from a potentially damaging deception and should further discour-
age clients from trusting and confiding in fellow prisoners.
B. SUCCESSIVE FEDERAL PETITIONS FOR HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF
The plurality in Kuhlmann v. Wilson failed to weigh accurately
the interests of the prisoner and the state in successive petitions for
federal habeas corpus and created a standard with a number of in-
herent shortcomings. The plurality devised a solution to a problem
which they failed, initially, to identify as a legitimate dilemma. Jus-
tice Powell contended, "Failure to provide clear guidance leaves dis-
trictjudges 'at large in disposing of applications for a writ of habeas
corpus,' creating the danger that they will engage in 'the exercise
not of law but of arbitrariness.' "226 The plurality, however, did not
demonstrate that federal courts have acted arbitrarily in their deci-
226 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2622 (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 497 (1953)(opin-
ion of Frankfurter, J.)).
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sions to entertain successive habeas petitions. 227 The Court should
identify a flaw in our judicial system before contemplating any legiti-
mate alternative.
While the dissent identified an area of constitutional concern
that has been balanced against the interests of the state,228 any inva-
sion into a constitutional right should be met with meticulous scru-
tiny. Indeed, in Stone v. Powell,229 where the Court arguably
permitted a balancing of interests in fourth amendment claims,230
the Court cautioned, "Our decision today is not concerned with the
scope of the habeas corpus statute as authority for litigating consti-
tutional claims generally." 23 1 In contrast, the Wilson plurality con-
tended, "[T]he Court has performed its statutory task [defining the
scope of the writ] through a sensitive weighing of the interests im-
plicated by federal habeas corpus adjudication of constitutional
claims determined adversely to the prisoner by the state courts." 232
The plurality referred to one authority to support the proposition
that state and prisoner interests are to be weighed in a habeas deter-
mination.233 This authority actually asserted, "Its [the habeas
writ's] root principle is that in a civilized society, government must
always be accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if
the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamen-
tal requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate
release." 234 The plurality failed to offer convincing support for its
proposition that the interests of the prisoner should be subject to
any balancing against the interests of the state. Any attempt, there-
fore, by the Wilson Court to balance state and prisoner interests
should be approached with great skepticism.
Even if a balancing of state and prisoner interests can be ac-
cepted as a legitimate judicial function in the context of habeas
corpus writs, careful attention must be given to the importance of
227 The plurality pointed out that the number of habeas corpus applications filed in
federal courts has grown but did not establish that this had led to arbitrary entertainment
of these applications. See id. at 2625 n.12.
228 Claims of constitutional violations that are procedurally defaulted in state court
have resulted in some balancing of state and prisoner interests. See supra notes 160-61
and accompanying text.
229 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See supra notes 91, 95-97 and accompanying text.
230 The plurality and Justice Brennan in dissent disagreed on whether a balancing of
interests had been undertaken by the Stone Court. See supra notes 94-97, 162-63 and
accompanying text.
231 Stone, 428 U.S. at 495 n.37 (emphasis in original).
232 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2624 (citing Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-29 (1982)). See
also Stone, 428 U.S. at 489-95; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426-34 (1963).
233 See Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2624 (citing Noia, 372 U.S. at 426-34).
234 Noia, 372 U.S. at 402.
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each interest implicated. The plurality identified finality as serving a
number of important state interests. 23 5 Sanders explicitly questioned.
the importance of finality concerns. 23 6 The Sanders Court empha-
sized, "Conventional notions of finality of litigation have no place
where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional
rights is alleged. ' 23 7 Despite the plurality's criticism of the Sanders
Court's indefiniteness, the plurality failed to recognize Sanders' un-
qualified advice that a state's interest in finality was not to be consid-
ered in a habeas corpus determination.
Assuming, however, that finality can be considered in a weigh-
ing of interests, further examination must be given to the interests
purportedly served by finality. The state has a legitimate interest in
controlling the costs associated with successive appeals and subse-
quent retrials. 238 The state, in addition, has a legitimate concern
that any retrial ordered may be virtually impossible to orches-
trate.239 There are, however, a number of state interests noted by
the plurality that cannot survive close scrutiny. The state's interest
in deterrence will not be served by a more rigorous standard for
successive habeas corpus petitions. It is inconceivable that ajealous
husband considering striking a discovered adulteress or a hungry
indigent considering robbing a liquor store would contemplate the
probability that their successive habeas corpus writ would be re-
viewed. Considering, moreover, the skepticism that prisons foster
rehabilitation, 240 the state's purported interest in rehabilitation is
not convincing. 24'
In response to a perceived need to balance the interests impli-
cated, the plurality adopted the "colorable showing of factual inno-
cence" standard. This standard had not been adopted by any other
federal tribunal and had no statutory support, but was the product
of a law review article written by Judge Friendly over fifteen years
ago.242 The standard requires the prisoner to show a fair
probability in light of all of the evidence, including that which was
235 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2626-27.
236 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963).
237 Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
238 See Friendly, supra note 118, at 145 n.12, for an excerpt of a speech made by Chief
Justice Burger. In this address, ChiefJustice Burger recounted the enormous amount of
resources expended during the prolonged litigation over one criminal act. Id.
239 See supra note 117.
240 See, e.g., Bainbridge, The Return of Retribution, 71 A.B.AJ. 60 (May 1985).
241 Judge Friendly suggested, however, "Neither is it an adequate answer that repen-
tance and rehabilitation may be thought unlikely in many of today's prisons. That is a
separate and serious problem, demanding our best thought but irrevelant to the issue
here." Friendly, supra note 118, at 146 (footnote omitted).
242 See supra note 118. Judge Friendly cited language from a lone dissenting opinion
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allegedly improperly admitted, that the trier of fact would have a
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.24 3 Although the "fair probability"
test gives district courts a more objective standard to apply, it will
not serve the courts' interest in expediting overcrowded dockets.
As the dissent noted, a district court will have to review each peti-
tion carefully and act as a rough equivalent to a trier of fact.244 The
substantial time required to review lengthy records and make such
decisions will effectively negate the rewards expected by adopting
the standard. The growing number of petitions the plurality found
as increasingly burdensome on the federal judicial system 245 will not
necessarily decrease as a result of the "colorable showing of factual
innocence" framework. Judge Friendly admitted:
Aside from the most drastic measures, changes that would narrow the
grounds available for collateral attack would not necessarily discour-
age prisoners from trying; they have everything to gain and nothing to
lose. Indeed, collateral attack may have become so much a way of
prison life as to have created its own self-generating force: it may now
be considered merely something done as a matter of course during
long incarceration. Today's growing number of prisoner petitions de-
spite the minute percentage granted points that way. 2 4 6
The standard, moreover, will not cover all habeas corpus pos-
sibilities. Applications for writs of habeas corpus that cite state
court errors at the sentencing stage of the trial proceedings cannot
use a standard hinged on a showing of innocence. 247 Since the de-
fendant's guilt has been affirmatively established before the sentenc-
ing phase of a criminal proceeding, a requirement of "a colorable
showing of factual innocence" is meaningless in that context. If dis-
trict court difficulties in applying a discretionary standard do indeed
exist, the Supreme Court will be forced to create another standard
to cover these instances as well.
The plurality, in adopting Judge Friendly's standard of "a col-
orable showing of factual innocence," neglected to observe that
Judge Friendly would not require such a showing in a sixth amend-
ment right to counsel dispute. Judge Friendly explained:
by justice Black for support. Friendly, supra note 118, at 142 (citing Kaufman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 217, 235-36, 242 (1969)(Black, J., dissenting)).
243 Friendly, supra note 118, at 160. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, repeatedly re-
ferred to "actual innocence" as the plurality test. See, e.g., Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2636 n.5
(Brennan, J., dissenting). This is an unfair mischaracterization of the burden of produc-
tion contemplated by the standard.
244 Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at 2636 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
245 Id. at 2625 & n.12.
246 Friendly, supra note 118, at 150 (footnote omitted).
247 This concern was noted by Justice Brennan in his dissent. Wilson, 106 S. Ct. at
2636 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Still, in these cases where the attack concerns the very basis of the
criminal process, few would object to allowing collateral attack regard-
less of the defendant's probable guilt. These cases would include all
those in which the defendant claims he was without counsel to whom
he was constitutionally entitled .... For, as Justice Schaefer of Illinois
has so wisely said, "Of all the rights that an accused person has, the
right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it
affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have."'248
Under the framework proposed by Judge Friendly, Wilson would
not be required to make "a colorable showing of factual innocence"
but need only assert that the "criminal process itself ha[d] broken
down."' 24 9 Claims of sixth amendment right to counsel violations,
furthermore, are not the only area of habeas review where Judge
Friendly found that an examination of the prisoner's claim is justi-
fied irrespective of any issue of innocence. 250 The plurality, how-
ever, did not identify any area of constitutional law where the
"colorable showing of factual innocence" framework would not ap-
ply. The plurality, instead, adopted the problematic "colorable
showing of factual innocence" standard based upon an ill-advised
weighing of prisoner and state interests.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Determining the scope of a suspect's sixth amendment right to
counsel is, admittedly, a difficult area of constitutional adjudication.
The interest in criminal justice and the successful investigation and
prosecution of persons who pose a "dangerous threat to those un-
identified and innocent people who will be the victims of crime to-
day and tomorrow" 25 1 is undoubtedly compelling. It is important,
therefore, that courts encourage and support emerging develop-
ments in police investigation. It is also important, however, that
they carefully consider the Supreme Court's warning in the early
decision of Spano v. New York: "But as law enforcement officers be-
come more responsible, and the methods used to extract confes-
248 Friendly, supra note 118, at 152 (quoting Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Tii-
als, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956)).
249 Friendly, supra note 118, at 151.
250 Judge Friendly cited three additional areas in which collateral attack in his imagi-
nary unitary system would be legitimate despite doubts over the defendant's innocence.
These areas included: 1) where a violation of constitutional rights is asserted on the
basis of facts foreign to the trial record and not considered by the reviewing tribunal;
2) where the state "failed to provide proper procedure for making a defense at trial and
on appeal"; and 3) where the alleged violation concerns an area of modern constitu-
tional developments bearing on criminal procedures. Friendly, supra note 118, at 152-
53.
251 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
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sions more sophisticated, our duty to enforce federal constitutional
protections does not cease. It only becomes more difficult because
of the more delicate judgments to be made. ' 252 In Kuhlmann v. Wil-
son, the United States Supreme Court turned its back on that "duty"
and ignored the import of the right to counsel line of decisions.
The majority essentially overlooked the well-considered informant
framework developed in Henry. Instead of focusing on the actions of
the state in their entirety, the majority limited its scrutiny to the ac-
tions of the jailhouse informant. The Court, in so doing, laid the
groundwork for a future of unsettling and unacceptable violations of
incarcerated suspects' constitutional rights.
The "colorable showing of factual innocence" framework cre-
ated by the plurality for review of successive federal petitions of
habeas corpus was grounded upon weak precedential underpin-
nings and a number of questionable Supreme Court assumptions.
Much of the standard's utility, moreover, is dependent upon the
ability of lower courts to effectively apply the test. In that respect,
the framework has several inherent shortcomings to overcome.
BRUCE D. LUNDSTROM
252 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321 (1959).
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